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Abstract. We live in an unjust world characterized by economic inequality. No liberal 
theory  of  justice  is  able  to  justify  it.  Inequality  is  not  “solved”  with  equality  of 
opportunity or meritocracy. Nor by the socialist and republican critique. The poor will 
have to count with them and with democracy to make social progress reality. In their 
political struggle, they will face one economic constraint: the expected profit rate must 
remain  attractive  to  business  investors.  Yet,  giving  that  technological  progress  in 
increasingly capital-saving, this economic constraint does not obstruct that wages grow 
above the productivity rate and inequality is reduced. What really is an obstacle to social 
justice in the rich countries is, on one hand, the power that capitalist rentiers retain and 
financists acquired, and, on the other, the competition originated in low wage countries. 
Key  words:  economic  equality,  social  justice,  technological  progress,  capital-saving 
technology. 
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We live in an unjust world. Inequality, both among people within each country and 
between countries in the world as a whole, is huge. It has existed ever since human 
societies  were  able  to  produce  an  economic  surplus  and  turned  into  “civilized” 
empires.  Since  then,  inequality  has  been  a  curse,  because  it  dissolves  human 
solidarity, pitting men against men, women against women, as the strong or the clever 
start  oppressing  the  weak  or  the  backward  to  achieve  power  and  appropriate  this 
economic surplus. No theory of justice, whether meritocratic or liberal, will justify 
such inequality. According to the meritocratic notion of justice, the ablest should be 
compensated.  Nevertheless,  the  poorer  in  each  society  are  not  less  endowed  with 
talents, nor less hard-working. On the other hand, a liberal theory of justice, such as 
that  of  John  Rawls,  justifies  inequality  provided  that  it  is  the  price  for  some 
improvement in the standard of living of the worst-off members of society. Yet the  
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huge differences of income and standard of living among people and among countries 
cannot be justified with this principle. We cannot say either that the growth rates in 
rich countries, which are higher than in developing countries (with the exception of 
some fast-growing Asian countries), are justified because they may benefit the worst-
off  poor  countries,  or,  within  each  country,  that  the  high  bonuses  received  by 
financiers  are  justified  by  the  modest  increase  in  the  income  of  the  poor.  This 
reasoning is embodied in the classical liberal justification of capitalism, but it is a 
poor one; the lack of clear alternative pathways does not make capitalism less unjust. 
Inequality may assume many forms. Human beings are supposed to have equal rights 
to liberty, to respect, to their own culture, to vote and to be elected, to material well-
being, but in reality they do not have such equal rights. To each of these rights there is 
a corresponding inequality: inequality of liberty – although constitutions proclaim that 
all citizens are  equal under the law, in practical terms they  are not; inequality of 
respect  –  the  poor  are  usually  treated  with  less  respect  than  the  rich;  political 
inequality – each citizen is entitled to one vote in democratic regimes, but their actual 
power  to  choose  politicians  or  to  influence  policy  varies  widely;  multicultural 
inequality – minority groups are supposed to have their cultures respected, but all 
societies impose some degree of integration; economic inequality – we know well 
how huge it is.  
In this article I will focus on economic inequality. The fact that I am an economist 
explains my choice. According to Michael Walzer’s (1984) theory of justice, we may 
admit inequalities within each “sphere of justice”, because each sphere will have a 
different principle of justice that is not necessarily based on straight equality.  But 
there is a rule that should never be disregarded: no one is entitled to cross the borders 
of the spheres of justice. Yet in capitalism we observe that the rich usually and with 
no  shame  cross  the  borders  of  the  spheres  of  justice;  because  they  are  rich,  they 
believe  that  are  more  entitled  to  power,  or  to  social  prestige,  or  to  respect,  or  to 
education, or to divine grace, or even to health care – the social goods that define the 
other  spheres  of  justice.  This  fact  shows  how  crucial  it  is  to  reduce  economic 
inequality. The aim is not to eliminate it, because this will never happen, but to limit 
its scope.  
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In discussing economic inequality we will probably consider the numbers of people 
that  suffer  from  hunger  (around  20  percent  of  the  world’s  population)  and  the 
numbers who live on less than one dollar per day (around a billion). According to 
Branko  Milanovic  (2007:  108),  global  inequality  measured  in  1998  by  the  Gini 
coefficient was as high as 64.1. This information is relevant, as are also relevant the 
normative political theories that discuss injustice, or the sociological theories that tie 
such inequality to capitalism or the class system, or the economic theories, such as the 
ones I will present here, that explain inequality in capitalist societies. All this, and 
particularly the socialist or the critical theories of capitalism, is relevant if we want to 
reduce inequality. Yet, although I believe that it is essential to criticize inequality and 
the theories and ideologies that legitimize it, I doubt whether socialist and republican 
intellectuals,  however  competent  their  critiques,  will  make  a  great  contribution  to 
reducing it. Ideas are important in reducing social injustice, but much more important 
is the political organization and struggle of the poor and the workers. I don’t believe 
that the proletariat has the key to the future – that it embodies the universal value of 
justice, as Marx and Engels supposed – but I am persuaded that the socialist political 
parties,  the  left-wing  associations,  and  the  left-wing  social  movements  that  were 
unable  to  build  an  alternative  economic  system  to  capitalism  have  nevertheless 
contributed substantially to a less unequal world. Whereas classical liberalism and the 
meritocratic or “efficientist” ideology
1 justify the present degree of inequality, two 
different  ideologies  were  effective  in  criticizing  it:  socialism  and  critical  theory 
contributed  to  reducing  inequality  among  people  within  each  country,  whereas 
developmentalism  –  the  national  development  strategy  behind  convergence  or 
catching up – contributed to the reduction of inequality among countries.  
We  know  well  that  unfettered  capitalism  is  an  unjust  mechanism  for  determining 
income  distribution.  The  economic  superiority  of  capitalism  over  the  failed 
experiments  to  establish  socialism  derived  originally  from  the  fact  that  men  and 
women  are  intrinsically  unequal  in  talents  and  in  cultural  and  economic  heritage, 
coupled with fact that capitalism is not troubled by that inequality. Yet this “original 
inequality” causing inequality should not be understood in terms of the conservative 
                                                 
1 Pardon the ugly name, but efficientism is the best word available to identify a fundamental 
ideology of the twentieth century – the ideology that principally legitimizes the power and 
income of the professional or techno-bureaucratic class.  
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tenet that since human nature is intrinsically unequal societies will be always unequal. 
This argument makes no sense, first, because in the concept of original inequality 
there  are  traits  that  are  socially  created  and  conserved;  second,  because  actual 
inequalities are substantially greater than the inequality that has its origin in individual 
talents. As for the fact that capitalism goes well with inequality – this is an intrinsic 
characteristic  of  this  type  of  society.  As  Max  Weber  recalled  in  discussing  the 
Protestant Reformation and Calvinism, wealth was a signal of divine grace. For sure, 
a reasonable economic equality is not a condition for the emergence of capitalism, 
whereas  it  is  for  the  emergence  of  socialism.  Capitalism  defeated  real  socialism 
because regulated markets proved to be more efficient than economic planning in 
coordinating complex national economies, but, besides that, the socialist project faced 
a major obstacle that was non-existent in capitalism. Both capitalism and socialism 
were supposed to be efficient, but, in addition, socialism was supposed to confront the 
original inequalities existing in society and to achieve a substantially less unequal 
distribution of wealth and income, while capitalism could happily live with rampant 
inequality. Socialist or statist countries never achieved economic equality, but they 
were substantially less unequal than capitalist countries with similar levels of income 
per capita. Yet the price they had to pay for that achievement or for being “above the 
curve” was authoritarianism and reduced efficiency. 
The immediate challenge to a socialist party that wins elections is to reduce inequality 
while keeping the rate of profit attractive to capitalists – sufficient to motivate them to 
invest. Socialist political parties soon become social democratic because they have no 
power  to  install  socialism:  their  real  and  difficult  challenge  has  been  to  manage 
capitalism more efficiently than the capitalists. They proved successful in so far as 
their policies of making capitalism less unjust did not reduce expected profits, or, in 
other  words,  they  did  not  prevent  entrepreneurs  and  entrepreneurial  business 
corporations  from  investing  and  innovating.  In  the  case  of  successful  developing 
countries – that is, of the underdeveloped countries that were able to industrialize and 
grow  or  to  realize  their  own  capitalist  revolution  –  not  socialist  but  left-wing 
developmentalist political parties were in certain cases able to reduce inequality in so 
far as they were able to supersede the colonial coalition of local merchants, local 
rentier capitalists and foreign interests. To do so they had to forge a political coalition 
of  public  bureaucrats  committed  to  a  national  development  strategy,  of  organized  
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labor,  and,  necessarily,  of  manufacturing  businessmen.  This  was  a  condition  for 
growth, but it limited the coalition’s capacity to reduce inequality. On the contrary, in 
most cases, the outcome was growth and increased inequality.  
Socialism and progress 
Meeting the challenge of creating a more just society depends on values – on the 
socialist belief that reasonable economic equality is not only a slogan but something 
to be fought for. But we have to be clear that it also depends on the political capacity 
to recognize and cope with the economic constraints on reducing inequality. In other 
words, it depends on politics. In modern societies, after the absolute state gave way to 
the liberal state, and the rule of law was established, politics became possible and a 
reality. Politics is the practice of governing, it is the act of reforming institutions and 
defining  public  policies,  it  is  the  art  of  persuasion  and  compromise  to  achieve 
majorities. It is through political action that the citizens organized as a civil society 
reform the state and change social life so as to make it less unequal. But politics is 
limited, on the one side, by the conservative political parties, the pressure groups and 
the  organizations  of  civil  society  associated  with  the  rich,  today  principally  the 
capitalist rentiers; and, on the other side, it is limited by the structural constraints of 
capitalism.  
Capitalism  is  a  form  of  organized  production  and  distribution  determined  by  the 
requirements of profit. In order to reduce inequality, wages need to grow faster than 
the productivity of labor. Yet, given the interest rate and the type of technical progress 
that is taking place, the fulfillment of the structural condition of economic growth will 
depend on the expected profit rate. If the rate of profit does not achieve a reasonably 
and  conventionally  established  satisfactory  level,  businessmen  and  business 
enterprises will not invest.  It follows that growth will slow down and wages will 
eventually  fall,  instead  of  increasing  faster  than  productivity,  which  is  the  basic 
condition for the reduction of inequality.  
An alternative is to propose a new and more just mode of production and distribution 
– socialism – where private ownership of the means of production is forbidden. Yet, 
although such an alternative cannot be completely ruled out, historical experience has 
shown that this is not realistic even for the richest and or most developed societies,  
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which  in  principle  are  closer  to  socialism.  The  Scandinavian  societies  present  the 
highest standards of equality in the world, but even there it is most improbable that 
the system of production will cease to be capitalist and become socialist in the near or 
even in the medium-term future. Socialism will be a viable alternative for a given 
society only after, on the one hand, democracy empowers the poor and the socialist 
parties;  and,  on  the  other,  after  certain  basic  social  and  economic  conditions  are 
fulfilled. First, and paradoxically, the level of equality achieved by such a society in 
the framework of capitalism will have to be high; only at a high level of equality will 
the democratization of education allow for an increase in the supply of individuals 
with such entrepreneurial and managerial capacity that it will not be necessary to 
motivate  entrepreneurial  initiative  with  large  executive  salaries,  stock  options  and 
bonuses. Second, socialism will become viable when capital is so abundant that the 
interest  rate  is  very  low  and  the  income  of  rentiers  limited.  Third,  socialism  will 
become viable when social expenditures by the state are so high and provide social 
services of such quality and efficiency that individual services will lose their present 
attraction.  In  other  words,  the  transition  to  socialism  depends  on  a  high  level  of 
income  per  capita  or  of  economic  growth  achieved  within  the  framework  of 
capitalism,  on  the  social  critique  of  capitalism,  and  on  social  reforms  that  make 
capitalism less unjust and the state, more capable. To the extent that such conditions 
are fulfilled, the transition to a form of social organization sufficiently egalitarian to 
merit the name of socialism will become a reality.   
We  are  far  from  achieving  such  an  ideal,  but  I  disagree  completely  with  the 
conservative rejection of the idea of human progress. I know that the rejection of the 
idea of progress is also part of critical philosophy, but when a critical philosopher like 
Adorno  expresses  his  pessimism,  this  attitude  adds  to  his  critical  weight,  but 
contradicts  the  ideas  of  revolution  and  emancipation.  The  denial  of  progress  is 
consistent with conservative thought – with an ideology that privileges order over 
justice and is permanently afraid of the new. Since the capitalist revolution, progress 
or development without adjectives has become a reality. If we take into consideration 
the more advanced European countries, we have to acknowledge that some steps have 
been taken in this direction. Critics will certainly argue that I am being too optimistic, 
that I am not a true socialist, and that it is impossible to make capitalism less unjust. I 
respect social criticism, because there is no social advance without it. Self-satisfaction  
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is always a threat to personal advancement as well as to social progress. Yet, since the 
capitalist revolution made the reinvestment of profits in production a condition of the 
survival of business enterprises, economic development has become embedded in the 
economic system. And, despite the short-term conflicts between the sustained growth 
of the economic surplus and the other political objectives shared by modern men and 
women, there is little doubt that in the medium term they are correlated. Thus, to 
assert, as I do, that socialism will be possible only at an advanced stage of capitalism 
does not mean that I don’t believe in socialism, or that I see inequality as something 
intrinsic to human nature or to social life. This would be true only if I didn’t believe in 
progress – but this is not the case. 
Thus, to return to reality, the three central questions that we must ask in relation to 
inequality within the capitalist system are: first, which are the structural economic 
constraints that nations face in reducing domestic inequality? Second, within such 
constraints, what level of freedom do they allow? Third, what can be done at the 
international level? This last question calls attention to the fact that inequality may 
increase  or  diminish  at  the  national  level,  among  the  inhabitants  (who  are  not 
necessarily all citizens) of a given country, and, at the international level, among the 
population of the entire world. Within a nation-state there is one major institution – 
the state – that acts or may act as an instrument of the collective action of civil society 
or  the  nation,  while  at  the  international  level  there  are  already  institutions  – 
international treaties, the United Nations – but no state. At the national level, civil 
society was separated from the state and eventually, in the context of democracy, was 
able to reduce inequality, although only to a limited degree. At the international level, 
a global civil society is still being structured and an international political system 
associated with the United Nations is emerging, but we are still far from a global 
state.  
The structural constraints 
I will begin with the structural conditions imposed by capitalism on the profit rate. 
Usually,  when  economists  discuss  the  structural  constraints  involved  in  income 
distribution,  they  base  their  model  on  a  simple  functional  distinction  between 
capitalists receiving profits and workers receiving wages. I did essentially that in two  
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works on the subject (Bresser-Pereira 1986; 2004), where my main concern was to 
relate distribution to the kinds of technological progress. Only in the last chapter of 
the  1986  book  did  I  add  the  professional  class  and  the  salaries  it  receives  to  the 
income equation. To focus only on wages and profits makes sense because it makes it 
possible to clarify the relations between the two key actors in a capitalist society, 
namely, capitalists and workers; but as this approach either lumps the professional or 
technobureaucratic  class  with  the  workers  or  ignores  it  altogether,  its  realism  is 
limited.  
In the model of growth and distribution, I inverted the classical theory of distribution 
adopted by David Ricardo and Karl Marx. Instead of considering wages as given at 
the subsistence level and profits as the residuum, I considered the profit rate as given 
and the wage rate as the residuum. Assuming in the model that the wage rate was 
constant, as classical economists did, proved historically wrong, whereas assuming 
the  profit  rate  as  given  and  constant  in  the  long  term  is  reasonable  because  the 
existing data confirm that the profit rate is relatively stable in the long run and that the 
wage rate grows as economic development takes place.
2 The profit rate fluctuates 
strongly over the business cycle but is constant in the long run because competition 
limits average profit rates. For that reason no economist argued that the profit rate 
tended to increase. On the other hand, the basic economic constraint in a capitalist 
economy  is  that  the  profit  rate  is  satisfactory  or,  to  use  Herbert  Simon’s  (1957) 
expression, “satisfying”, that is, it is sufficient to stimulate businessmen to invest. 
Thus, if we assume that economic growth is taking place as a consequence of capital 
accumulation and technical progress, the profit rate will be allowed to move below or 
above that satisfactory level in limited way and for only short periods. Competition 
limiting and institutions protecting the profit rate will make it fluctuate around the 
satisfactory level. Businessmen may seek to maximize profits, but they are satisfied 
and ready to invest if the expected profit rate is clearly higher than the market interest 
rate. Entrepreneurs aim at profits but they also struggle to expand, which increases 
their  power.  Their  “animal  spirits”  (Keynes  1936)  or  their  need  for  achievement 
                                                 
2 The data on long-term variables are not fully reliable, but according to, for instance, Gérard 
Duménil and Dominique Lévy (2001: Fig. 1) – probably the most competent researchers of 
the Marxian variables – the profit rate varied in long cycles between 1869 and 1999, but 
around a 16% average.   
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(McClelland 1961), make them invest and innovate. Obviously the profit rate is not 
constant in the short or the medium term. Capitalist growth is cyclical, and the profit 
rate will fluctuate with the short and the long cycle. However, it is reasonable to assert 
in relation to the past (the available data point in this direction) and to predict in 
relation to the future that the profit rate in the long run will be constant. 
To understand the structural constraints on income distribution or the reduction of 
inequality, it is practical to use the concepts that Karl Marx adopted to formulate his 
thesis of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, and to make one key variable, 
namely,  technical  progress  measured  in  terms  of  the  productivity  of  capital,  vary 
historically.  There  is  technical  progress  whenever  labor  productivity  (which 
corresponds approximately to income per capita) is increasing. But, in terms of the 
productivity of capital, current technical progress may be capital-using, neutral, or 
capital  saving,  depending  on  the  character  of  the  output–capital  relation  or  the 
productivity of capital. If the output–capital ratio is decreasing, technical progress will 
be capital using or the productivity of capital will be falling; if it is constant, technical 
progress will be neutral; if the output–capital ratio is increasing, technical progress 
will be capital saving or the productivity of capital will be rising. When technical 
progress is neutral, wages can rise with productivity and distribution can be constant 
while the profit rate is constant; when it is capital saving, wages can rise above the 
productivity rate and distribution improve or inequality diminish while the profit rate 
remains constant at a satisfactory level.  
Under what conditions does the productivity of capital decrease or increase? It usually 
falls  in  the  first  stage  of  industrialization,  when  business  enterprises  substitute 
machines  for  labor;  it  rises  in  the  later  stages  of  industrialization  when  business 
enterprises  have  already  substituted  machines  and  software  for  labor  and  now 
primarily  substitute  new  and  more  efficient  machines  for  old  ones;  and  is  neutral 
when the two kinds of technical progress are balanced, one checking the other. 
In equation (1) we see that the rate of profit r = R/K depends on the distribution of 
income R/K and the productivity of capital, Y/K:  
r = R/K = R/Y / K/Y    (1)  
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If we assume that the economy is growing or labor productivity increasing and that 
the profit rate is constant, what will happen to wages and to income distribution or 
inequality? Given a constant rate of profit, (1) if technical progress is neutral (or the 
output–capital ratio is constant), inequality will remain constant, and average wages 
or the wage rate will increase at the same rate as labor productivity; (2) if technical 
progress  is  capital  using  (or  the  productivity  of  capital  is  falling,  as  happened  in 
Marx’s time), inequality will increase and the wage rate will increase more slowly 
than  productivity  or  even  fall;  (3)  if  technical  progress  is  capital  saving  (or  the 
productivity of capital is increasing), inequality will diminish and wages will grow 
faster than the increase in labor productivity.  
Phases of capitalist development 
Taking Britain as reference (because it was the first country to complete the Industrial 
Revolution),  and  given  mainly  these  types  of  technical  progress,  we  can  divide 
capitalist  development  after  the  long  primitive  accumulation  period,  in  which  the 
basis  for  economic  growth  was  established,  into  five  phases:  first,  the  Industrial 
Revolution  phase,  approximately  in  the  50  years  before  1800;  second,  the  post-
Industrial Revolution or Marxian phase between 1801 and 1850; third, the “classical” 
phase between 1851 and 1948; fourth, the “30 golden years of capitalism” between 
1949 and 1978; and, finally, the “30 neoliberal years of capitalism”, between 1979 
and 2008. Naturally, these dates beginning and ending the phases are approximate; 
transitions from one phase to another are not always clear and are not completed in 
only one year. 
Phases of capitalist development 











Industrial Revolution (1750 – 
1800) 
Capital using  Constant   Falling   Increasing 
Post-Industrial  Revolution  
or Marxian phase (1801-1850) 
Capital using  Falling  Constant  Constant 
“Classical  capitalism”  phase 
(1851-1948) 
Neutral  Constant  Increasing  Constant 




Constant  Increasing  Decreasing 
30  neoliberal  years  (1979- Capital- Constant  Constant  Increasing  
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2008)  saving 
 
In four of the five phases the rate of profit is assumed to be constant. Only in the 
Marxian  phase  it  is  assumed  to  be  falling  because  technical  progress  was  capital 
using; thus, to keep the profit rate constant, wages should be falling. Since in the 
previous phase the proletarianization process had driven the remuneration of workers 
to subsistence level, the only logical possibility was a falling rate of profit.  
In  the  first  period,  the  primitive  accumulation  and  Industrial  Revolution  period 
between 1750 and 1800, inequality increased because wages were probably falling. 
Technical  progress  was  capital  using  since  industrialization  is  a  process  of 
mechanization or of substitution of machines for labor that takes place approximately 
according to a rational sequence. First, firms substitute the less costly or the more 
efficient  machines  for  labor,  and  after,  step  by  step,  they  substitute  less  efficient 
machines that are still more efficient than direct labor. Given this sequence, whenever 
a  less  efficient  group  of  machines  replaces  labor,  the  productivity  of  labor  will 
increase  but  the  output–capital  relation  will  fall;  in  consequence,  the  average 
productivity of the stock of capital will decrease. Since technical progress was capital 
using and the profit rate was constant at a high level, the wage rate had necessarily to 
grow more slowly than the productivity rate or to fall, and inequality had to rise. The 
period of the Industrial Revolution or of mechanization is also the classical period of 
“proletarianization”  –  of  the  transformation  of  peasants  into  industrial  workers. 
Strictly speaking, that this was not a period of falling “wages”, because peasants were 
not wage earners, but it surely was a period of falling standards of living.  
In the second phase, the post-Industrial Revolution or Marx’s phase, mechanization 
continued  or  technical  progress  remained  capital  using,  but  inequality  ceased  to 
increase and remained constant. Since the wage rate had reached subsistence level and 
could  not  be  further  reduced,  the  profit  rate  necessarily  had  to  decrease.  This 
happened  in  Britain  in  the  50  years  after  the  Industrial  Revolution.  Yet  capitalist 
development was not endangered, investments were not paralyzed, because the profit 
rate fell from an exceptional level that prevailed during the Industrial Revolution to a 
level that was still attractive to business entrepreneurs. In this period, inequality was 
reduced  not  because  wages  increased  (they  remained  constant),  but  because  the  
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average rate of profit fell. I like to call this period “Marxian” because  it was the 
period that Marx was living in and directly observing – a period in which the rate of 
profit was, exceptionally, falling. 
Technical progress, however, would not consist of “mechanization” (the substitution 
of  increasingly  inefficient  machines  for  labor)  forever.  Approximately  between 
around 1851 and 1950, in the time of classical capitalism, technical progress changed 
from capital using to neutral (a constant output–capital relation). Given also that the 
profit rate remained constant, wages should increase along with productivity, as did 
happen. Thus inequality remained constant, while real wages were increasing. 
Technical progress, however, continued to evolve when countries were already fully 
mechanized. Thus, in the fourth phase of capitalist development, in the 30 golden or 
glorious years of capitalism, after World War II (1949–78), technical progress became 
modestly capital saving. Instead of primarily substituting machines for labor, business 
firms now were mainly (but not exclusively) substituting less costly or more efficient 
machines  for  old  machines.  The  computer  industry  dramatically  illustrates  this 
process.  That  is  the  reason  why,  in  that  golden  age  of  capitalism,  inequality 
diminished  in  the  rich  countries  whereas  the  profit  rate  remained  constant  and 
attractive to businessmen. The constancy of the profit rate was consistent with wages 
rising faster than the productivity of labor because the productivity of capital was 
increasing. In fact, in that period the advanced economies experienced high rates of 
growth and financial stability, while inequality clearly diminished.  
Back to increased inequality 
After the 1970s, however, new historical facts changed the picture. Given just the 
variables  that  I  have  being  using  so  far,  and  given  a  constant  profit  rate  and  an 
increasing  output–capital  ratio,  wages  should  continue  to  increase  faster  than 
productivity  and  inequality  should  continue  to  fall.  Instead,  wages  stalled  and 
inequality  increased.  How  to  explain  that?  Why  did  the  bright  golden  age  of 
capitalism  turned  into  the  somber  neoliberal  years?  The  key  explanation  of  this 
perverse change is political.  
In the 1970s, the pressure of organized labor for more wages and, especially the first 
OPEC oil shock and the general increase in commodity prices squeezed the profit  
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rate, which fell sharply in the United States together with the growth rate.
3 On the 
other hand, these same factors caused an increase in inflation despite feeble aggregate 
demand;  in  other  words,  they  caused  “stagflation”  or  “inertial  inflation”.  The 
response, principally of the two more severely affected countries, United States and 
Britain,  was  neoliberalism  and  financialization,  a  return  to  and  radicalization  of 
economic  liberalism  and  the  development  of  financial  innovations  that  created 
fictitious wealth, that is, a great increase of the remuneration of capitalist rentiers and 
of the bright young professionals – the financiers – who invented and managed such 
speculative and risky financial instruments. Since the Great Depression of the 1930s, 
economic liberalism had been largely abandoned in favor of the Keynesian or social-
democratic ideas that, after World War II, in the 30 golden years of capitalism were 
effective in building the welfare or social state, mainly in Europe. But in the 1970s, 
with  the  reduction  in  profit  rates,  liberalism  combined  with  meritocratic 
professionalism  returned  in  new  clothes,  transformed  into  a  reactionary  ideology: 
neoliberalism.  The change was complete with the coming to power of Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher in Britain and President Ronald Reagan in the United States. In 
order to deal with the profit squeeze, the new administrations in the United States and 
Britain  were  ready  to  reduce  direct  and  indirect  wages  and  to  introduce  more 
“flexible”  labor  laws,  that  is,  to  repeal  laws  protecting  the  workers.    This  radical 
response overlooked the fact that the 1970s crisis was cyclical, not structural.  The 
idea was to reverse the distributional trend that the increase in the productivity of 
capital had allowed and organized labor had achieved: to increase inequality rather 
than  reduce  it,  even  though  structural  conditions  were  supportive  of  the  gradual 
increase of wages in relation to profits without endangering a reasonable profit rate. 
Yet,  to  understand  the  neoliberal  years  and  the  increasing  inequality  that  then 
occurred in rich countries, domestic factors alone are not sufficient. We need to take 
into consideration two international or global factors that made the neoliberal political 
coalition  so  aggressive:  increasing  competition  from  developing  countries  and 
increasing immigration to rich countries. Trade liberalization made possible increased 
competition from low-paid workers in developing countries and depressed wages in 
                                                 
3 In reality, according to Duménil and Lévy (2002), the profit rate began to fall in the United 
States after World War II, but recovered in the late 1950s, only to fall again, sharply, in the 
1970s. Only after 1982 would a recovery begin.  
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rich countries. Since the beginning of the 1970s, with the emergence of the newly 
industrializing  countries  (NICs),  for  the  first  time  the  North  was  confronted  with 
competition from low-wage developing countries. Some NICs, such as  Brazil and 
Mexico in the 1970s and China from the early 1980s, with low wages and a managed 
and competitive exchange rate, profited from the opportunity offered by globalization 
and were highly successful in exporting manufactured goods to the rich countries. To 
this fact we have to add the major increase in immigration to rich countries, which 
directly depressed their wage levels. This rise in immigration did not result from rich 
countries  opening  their  borders  –  on  the  contrary,  they  strictly  controlled  their 
frontiers – but from the pressure on the poor to emigrate in order to improve their 
usually miserable standards of living, combined with the reduction in the costs of 
transport and communication. This, along with the unacknowledged interest of rich 
countries in employing cheap labor, explains the increase of immigration.  
The neoliberal and meritocratic domestic response to these challenges was market-
oriented institutional reform: privatization, deregulation, a flattening of the existing 
progressive income tax system, flexibilization of laws protecting labor, and economic 
incentives  for  workers  and  professionals.  Between  1978  and  2008  the  world 
experienced the “neoliberal years”. In the rich countries increased competition and 
policies  repressing  wages  were  effective  in  keeping  wages  stagnant,  whereas 
productivity and economic output continued to increase, although at lower rates than 
in the golden age.  
Does this mean that the profit rate increased? Although the data on this matter are 
imprecise, I believe that it did not; the profit rate was kept at a satisfactory level. To 
whom, then, was transferred the increased economic surplus resulting from wages 
growing more slowly than productivity or even becoming stagnant, whereas capital-
saving technical progress allowed for increased wages? First, some of the supposedly 
greater economic surplus did not materialize; instead, the gains accrued largely to 
fast-growing  middle-income  countries,  particularly  China,  which  exported 
manufactured  goods  and  experienced  higher  rates  of  growth.  Second,  neoliberal 
ideology and the consequent deregulation of financial markets allowed the political 
coalition  behind  capitalist  rentiers  and  financiers  to  capture  a  major  part  of  the 
surplus, in the form not of profits but of dividends, increases in financial wealth, and 
bonuses. Modern rentiers or inactive capitalist living on interest, rent and dividends  
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were unhappy with the low rates that prevailed in the golden age – most probably, as 
John  Kenneth  Galbraith  remarked  in  his  1967  classic  book,  The  Industrial  State, 
because capital had become abundant in the world. In consequence, the real rates 
accruing to rentiers were around 2 or 3 percent a year – a little above the interest rate 
on US Treasury bonds. It was eventually to “solve” this problem that a coalition of 
financial operators or financiers and capitalist rentiers was formed; and, based on this 
coalition, financialization – an increase of fictitious capital at a rate three or four times 
that of the increase of production – materialized. This was possible not only because 
the more risky financial innovations were more profitable, but also because classic 
speculation in asset markets (principally in stock, real estate and oil) created bubbles – 
stock  exchange  bubbles,  commodity  bubbles,  real  estate  bubbles  –  a  daily 
phenomenon in the neoliberal years.  
Financiers  did  not  offer  this  gain  to  rentiers  for  free.    Since  the  golden  age,  the 
professional class and particularly the high executives of all corporations were able to 
substantially increase their pay – in the form not only of direct salaries but also in 
bonuses and stock options – in the name of meritocratic values. This was predictable 
because organizations had replaced family units as the basic productive unit, because 
in  organizations  professionals  or  executives  play  a  strategic  role,  because  high 
executives replaced stockholders as controllers of the organizations and determined 
their  own  remuneration,  because,  in  sum,  the  strategic  factor  of  production  was 
ceasing to be capital and becoming knowledge. In such conditions, the professional or 
techno-bureaucratic  class,  that  is,  the  controllers  of  administrative,  technical,  and 
communicative knowledge, benefited.  In principle, benefits should have accrued to 
the workers as the productivity of labor as well as of capital increased. In fact, they 
accrued mainly to high executives and financiers. Since the 1950s, high professional 
executives,  and  since  the  1980s  also  financiers  –  both  part  of  the  professional  or 
techno-bureaucratic class – gained sufficient political power to be able to capture a 
substantial part of the economic surplus that was being produced by the economic 
system.  
The professional or technobureaucratic class had already grown large and powerful 
and its efficientist and meritocratic ideology had become widespread by the 1950s. 
This became still more evident in the 1980s, when salaries and bonuses increased 
enormously, making the simple profit–wage functional distribution that I have been  
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using  to  measure  inequality  unrepresentative.  It  would  be  necessary  to  take  into 
consideration salaries and bonuses to gauge the relation between salaries and wages, 
or,  since  this  measure  is  normally  not  available,  to  take  into  consideration  the 
distribution based on deciles of income, despite the shortcomings that these statistics 
suffer  from  because  they  underestimate  the  income  accruing  to  capital.  In  the 
neoliberal  years,  for  instance,  wages  remained  practically  stagnant  in  the  United 
States whereas salaries – mainly high salaries – and bonuses skyrocketed. 
This distortion in favor of the professional class will not be corrected soon.  So long 
as education does not allow for an increase in the supply of professionals sufficient to 
reduce their market value, high executives and financiers will continue to capture a 
sizable share of the economic surplus. Even after that, they will probably continue to 
have large remuneration, for two additional reasons: because high executives control 
the management boards of the great corporations, and because, in a world where the 
value of the business enterprise is measured by discounting its cash flow, competent 
executives  have  a  strategic  weight  in  such  value:  a  competent  management  can 
increase the value of  a business enterprise, and an incompetent one can reduce it 
sharply, in a relatively short time span. Thus, unless democracy is deepened, and the 
state is able to reduce income inequality through progressive taxation and through the 
orientation of social expenditure toward the poor, inequality deriving from the relative 
shortage  of  highly  qualified  professionals  and  from  the  widespread  meritocratic 
ideology that legitimizes large differences in incomes will probably continue to be 
very great, despite the adoption of increasingly capital-saving technologies that allow 
for the reduction of inequality without risking making the profit rate not satisfactory 
for business entrepreneurship. On the other hand, even when constraints related to 
satisfactory profit rates and to supply and demand of knowledge people are relatively 
neutralized, ideologies legitimizing inequality will continue to limit the scope of the 
political fight against inequality. 
To sum up, always having Britain as paradigm because it was the first country to 
complete its Industrial Revolution:  
first,  after  the  long  phase  of  primitive  accumulation,  in  the  Industrial  Revolution, 
approximately  between  1750  and  1800,  inequality  increased,  because  technical 
progress was capital using, but investment materialized because the profit rate was  
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maintained at a high level while the wage rate or the standards of living of workers 
deteriorated to the subsistence level;  
second,  immediately  after  the  Industrial  Revolution,  in  the  Marxian  phase 
(approximately 1801–50), inequality remained constant while the wage rate remained 
at the subsistence level, in so far as technical progress remained capital using, but the 
profit rate fell;  
third, in the classical phase, between 1850 and 1950, inequality remained constant as 
technical progress became neutral, and it was possible to increase the wage rate in line 
with the increase in productivity while the profit rate remained attractive to capitalist 
entrepreneurs;  
fourth,  in  the  golden  age  of  capitalism,  approximately  between  1950  and  1980, 
inequality was reduced as technical progress became moderately capital saving, which 
allowed wages and salaries to increase while the profit rate remained constant; 
fifth, since 1980, in the neoliberal years, inequality increased even though technical 
progress continued to be capital saving, in principle allowing the profit rate to remain 
constant while wages and salaries increased faster than productivity; instead, wages 
increased  more  slowly  than  productivity  or  became  stagnant  because  they  were 
depressed not only by neoliberal policies but also by the competition from immigrants 
and from fast-growing middle-income countries exporting manufactured goods, while 
the profit rate remained constant and the salaries and bonuses of the professional class 
– particularly of the richest 2 per cent – increased greatly.  
In the near future, after the 2008 financial crisis, it is possible that inequality will 
remain constant because technical progress will continue to be capital saving, and this 
may compensate for the negative effects on wages stemming from competition from 
developing countries exporting manufactured goods, and from immigration. As for 
neoliberal and meritocratic policies aiming to increase inequality, they will probably 
be neutralized because the political coalition promoting them was severely hit by the 
2008 global financial crisis. Yet we should not be optimistic: the neoliberal coalition 




All the above relates to distribution within rich countries. What to say of developing 
countries? What to say about the distribution within developing countries and between 
them  and  rich  countries?  First,  we  have  to  distinguish  poor  from  middle-income 
countries; second, among the latter we must distinguish the fast-growing from the 
slow-growing  countries.  But  before  that,  it  is  necessary  to  remember  an  old, 
insightful, but not fully consistent theory: the Kuznets curve. According to Simon 
Kuznets (1955), economic development is characterized by an inverted U curve. In 
the  beginning  of  the  process,  income  is  concentrated;  after  some  time  inequality 
ceases to increase; and eventually inequality diminishes. Why?  One explanation is 
the tendency of technical progress to change from capital using to capital saving. But 
Kuznets did not use it. Instead, using simple supply and demand reasoning, he argued 
that  in  the  early  stages  of  growth  investment  in  physical  capital  is  the  main 
mechanism of economic development; thus, the rich, who supposedly save and invest 
more, will be compensated by high profits and by an increasing share of national 
income.  After  some  time,  however,  this  tendency  is  exhausted  as  knowledge  or 
human capital becomes increasingly strategic and wages and salaries grow faster than 
profits.  
I believe that the two theoretical frameworks outlined above are valid explanations of 
the inverted U shape of the distribution. Yet there is historical way of looking at the 
problem that takes into consideration either, in terms of Marx, the transition from pre-
capitalist to capitalist societies or, in terms of modernization theory, the transition 
from traditional to modern societies. According to these two views, this transition, 
especially its main episode, the Industrial Revolution, is highly income-concentrating 
in so far as it causes the proletarianization of the peasants. Yet in Latin America and 
particularly  in  Brazil,  where  a  mercantilist  colonization  combined  with  slavery 
prevailed, an egalitarian peasant society such as the one that existed in the north of 
United States never emerged. Inequality was inherent in the mercantilist colonization, 
the plantation system and slavery. Thus, when industrialization begins, there is an 
unlimited supply of labor to manufacturing industry at very low wages. This fact, 
combined with the existence of an industry that exports some commodity using local 
natural  resources,  creates  the  conditions,  in  a  first  moment,  for  primitive 
accumulation, and, in the second, for industrialization. In both moments, income is  
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very highly concentrated. The capital accumulated in this export industry creates an 
opportunity  for  industrialization  still  within  the  framework  of  a  highly  unequal 
society. Industrialization will be initially oriented to the domestic market, and will 
keep  inequality  high,  because  Arthur  Lewis’s  (1954)  “unlimited  supply  of  labor” 
prevents wages from growing with the increase in labor productivity.  
To  consider  only  the  economic  variables,  inequality  in  a  developing  country  will 
continue to increase so long as an “unlimited” supply of labor or a reserve army of 
unemployed or underemployed workers does not become exhausted. The economic 
surplus produced in manufacturing will benefit not only the capitalist class but also 
the professional middle class. These two groups plus a layer of highly skilled workers 
form the modern or capitalist sector of the dual or underdeveloped economy, whereas 
the other workers remain in the “marginal” sector, which is no longer an untouched 
pre-capitalist  or  traditional  sector  but  sector  complementary  and  functional  to  the 
process of capital accumulation and growth.   
Before this marginal sector is exhausted, what can put a stop to income concentration 
is  democratic  transition.  Usually,  the  victorious  political  coalition  that  achieved 
democracy relied on the participation of the working class and, more broadly, of the 
poor.  Thus,  after  coming  to  power,  it  is  constrained  to  adopt  income  policies 
benefiting the poor. This is what happened in Brazil in the 1985 democratic transition. 
The democratic political coalition assumed political commitments to the poor that 
were relatively honored after the transition. Since 1985, successive administrations 
have adopted a variety of policies aiming to reduce inequality, by making health care 
and  basic  education  universal  services,  by  increasing  the  minimum  wage,  or  by 
adopting relatively focused minimum-income policies. In consequence, inequality in 
Brazil between 2001 and 2008, measured in terms of the Gini index, although still 
high, fell from 0.594 to 0.544, while, between 1999 and 2008, the minimum wage 
increased by 61 percent in real terms...
4  
                                                 
4 Source: Hoffman (2009). Although the minimum wage played a role in the systematic 
reduction in inequality in Brazil, in a personal conversation with Rodolfo Hoffman he 
remarked that this reduction began before the minimum wage increases – in 1995.  
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Conclusion and distribution among countries 
To  summarize,  rich  countries  have  already  reached  the  stage  of  capital-saving 
technology  where  a  reduction  of  inequality  is  consistent  with  a  constant  and 
satisfactory profit rate, but, in contrast with what occurred in the 30 golden years of 
capitalism, their societies have been unable to use this opportunity in the succeeding 
neoliberal  and  meritocratic  years.    Concurrent  with  this  negative  outcome,  which 
occurred  for  political  or  ideological  reasons  associated  with  neoliberalism  and 
meritocracy, competition from middle-income  countries began in the  1970s, when 
they  started  to  export  manufactured  goods  to  rich  countries  and  sections  of  their 
populations  started  to  migrate  to  rich  countries.  These  last  two  factors  depressed 
wages in rich countries. In other words, the domestic constraints were reduced, but the 
international  constraints  and  the  hegemony  of  two  reactionary  ideologies 
(neoliberalism and meritocracy) worked against equality.  
Developing  countries,  on  the  other  hand,  are  probably  either  in  the  phase  of 
mechanization, when the productivity of capital is falling, or in the classic phase of 
capitalist  development,  where  it  is  constant.  The  countries  that  are  in  this  latter 
condition could grow without increasing inequality, but they face a major obstacle: 
the unlimited supply of labor. Democracy, however, may force elites and politicians 
to adopt effective redistributive policies. 
So far I have discussed distribution within countries, both rich and developing. This is 
what specialists working in the area of measuring inequality normally do. Yet we 
must also consider distribution among countries. On that matter, one thing is clear. 
Fast  economic  growth  and  catching  up  in  developing  countries  are  effective  in 
reducing world inequality, even though many of these developing countries are in the 
phase of increasing domestic inequality. This seems a contradiction or a paradox, but 
it  is  not.  To  take,  for  example,  the  limiting  case  of  China:  after  it  abandoned 
communism and adopted state-led capitalism in the 1970s, growth was enormous, and 
concentration  of  income  equally  great.  Yet,  since  1980,  and  notwithstanding  the 
domestic increase in inequality, more than 400 million people have left the condition 
of poverty; and almost all the 1.4 billion Chinese have reduced the difference between 
their average income and that of rich countries. Obviously, this fact has contributed to 
some  reduction  in  world  inequality.  The  Gini  coefficient  for  the  “weighted  
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international inequality” (which should not be confused with the “global inequality” 
previously referred to) fell down 55.7 in 1965 to 50.5 in 2000 (Milanovic 2007: 85). 
This  happened  because  several  developing  countries,  particularly  some  Asian 
countries, grew faster than rich countries. The improvement in domestic distribution 
in some of these countries may have played a role, but most probably a small one. 
We know that in the short run economic growth causes income concentration, while 
in the long run it causes a reduction of inequalities not only because of the character 
of technical progress, but also because richer countries tend to be democratic, and in 
democracies economic policies tend to reduce inequality. In this case, however, we 
observe that in the short run economic growth in poor and middle-income countries 
causes a reduction in international inequality independently of democracy. 
In  this  article  I  have  argued  that  policymakers  in  democratic  states,  usually 
representing  left-wing  or  social-democratic  political  parties,  are  able  to  achieve  a 
reduction of inequality. In other words, there is some discretion for politics in this 
matter. The social or welfare states built in western and northern Europe after World 
War II are proof of this possibility. Some favorable results in developing countries are 
another. Two basic means are used. On one side, the adoption of progressive taxes; on 
the other, an increase in the tax burden to finance increased social services in the areas 
of  education,  health  care,  social  security  and  social  assistance.  In  this  last  area, 
minimum income or basic income programs may effectively reduce inequality. The 
adoption and gradual increase of the minimum wage is also a major redistributive 
policy.  
Given  our  economic  structural  constraints  –  basically  the  rate  of  profit  –  who  is 
supposed to pay for these redistributive policies? We may always say that there is 
some room for reducing profits, but this is a poor response. Those who must see their 
incomes reduced in democratic societies are capitalist rentiers and the top level of the 
professional class – both groups whose incomes bear no relation to their contribution 
to  society.  In  successful  experiences  of  income  redistribution  within  the  capitalist 
system,  entrepreneurs  or  entrepreneurial  business  enterprises  continued  to  make 
satisfactory profits, whereas inactive or rentier capitalists living on interest, rents and 
dividends  lost  income.  Keynes,  in  the  General  Theory  (1936),  referred  to  the 
“euthanasia  of  the  rentiers”.  In  modern,  social  capitalism,  in  the  welfare  state,  
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democratic politics is supposed to follow this path, to combat the curse of inequality. 
As for a reduction in the outlandish pay of high executives and financiers – this is a 
battle  that  is  just  beginning,  which  reached  the  public  agenda  in  the  2008  global 
financial crisis.   An increased tax burden on the remuneration of capitalist rentiers 
and high professionals will not make capitalism just, but it will reduce its intrinsic 
injustice.  
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